On October 9, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Tajikistan for a state visit, marking a significant diplomatic event. Dushanbe will host a summit of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) heads of state and the second Russia-Central Asia summit. This visit will be pivotal not only for Tajikistan but for the entire Central Asian region, reflecting Moscow's current position in the area.
Increasing strategic importance of Central Asia in the modern world
In the past decade, international relations have undergone profound changes, particularly with shifts in the global power structure. In the early 2010s, both Russia and China gained enough strength to challenge the post-Cold War order. In 2013, China launched its global geo-economic project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and in 2014, Russia's relations with the West soured, culminating in the full-scale conflict in Ukraine in 2022.
These geopolitical tensions have led to the formation of opposing blocs: on one side, liberal democracies led by the U.S. and its allies in NATO and the G7; on the other, rising authoritarian powers led by China and Russia, grouped in organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The growing global instability, along with resource competition, has heightened the strategic importance of Central Asia.
Central Asia's rapid economic growth further underscores its importance. In 2019, the region's GDP stood at $347 billion, and by 2024, it is expected to grow to $520 billion—an increase of nearly 50%. Central Asia's resources are vast: Kazakhstan holds 1.8% of the world’s oil reserves, while Turkmenistan ranks fourth in natural gas reserves. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are also significant players in uranium production, and the region is rich in rare-earth elements crucial for high-tech industries. These resources, along with the region's key position for international logistics, make Central Asia a focal point of global competition.
Russia’s priorities in Central Asia after February 2022
Following the onset of the war in Ukraine, Central Asia became a top priority for Russian foreign policy. Western sanctions have severed traditional supply chains, prompting Moscow to seek new markets for its products and alternative means of importing essential goods, particularly in the defense sector.
The sanctions have spurred trade growth between Russia and Central Asia. Between 2021 and 2024, exports from Kazakhstan to Russia grew by over 35%, from Uzbekistan nearly doubled, and from Kyrgyzstan, exports increased by 4.5 times. Central Asian countries have also become key suppliers of sanctioned goods, such as electronics, automotive parts, industrial machinery, and medical equipment, often re-exported to Russia. This trend further strengthens Russia’s economic ties with the region.
Additionally, Central Asia has become crucial to Russia’s energy sector. After losing access to European markets, Russia has significantly increased oil and fuel exports to Central Asia, while also gaining greater control over uranium supplies, particularly from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
The political and diplomatic dimensions of Russia’s strategy
For Russia, maintaining control over Central Asia’s resources is not just about economics but also about political leverage. Geopolitical rivals have been reducing their dependence on Moscow for energy imports, seeking alternatives in Central Asia. As part of this shift, the European Union has increased its uranium imports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while reducing reliance on Russia.
Russia is also keen to maintain its influence over Central Asia’s transport corridors. The region’s strategic position as a key node in global logistics is vital for Russia, especially as trade routes bypassing Russia gain importance. The “Middle Corridor,” which avoids Russian territory, has seen a significant 80% increase in cargo traffic since 2022, further challenging Moscow’s regional dominance.
In this context, Russia’s military and diplomatic presence in Central Asia becomes essential to safeguarding its interests, both in terms of resources and geopolitical influence. The Kremlin's pursuit of regional dominance is evident in its investments in infrastructure, energy projects, and military cooperation.
What will Putin’s visit bring?
As Russia seeks to strengthen its ties with Central Asia, the key question remains: will Putin’s visit change the regional balance of power? Historically, summits like those held within the CIS framework have become symbolic rituals rather than occasions for substantial policy breakthroughs. While Moscow is expected to offer technological expertise and investment in areas such as energy, logistics, and digitalization, its proposals are unlikely to match the concrete offers made by China or the European Union.
For instance, during the second China-Central Asia summit, Beijing pledged $208 million in grants for development projects and announced several major energy and industrial initiatives. Similarly, the European Union, through the Global Gateway initiative, offered a €12 billion investment package for sustainable development and infrastructure in the region.
In contrast, past Russian summits have focused more on reaffirming existing relationships and emphasizing historical ties, with little in the way of tangible economic or diplomatic commitments. While Moscow will likely present proposals related to energy, infrastructure, and defense cooperation, it is unclear whether these will be sufficient to tip the regional balance in Russia’s favor.
Conclusion: limited prospects for major shifts
As Central Asia’s geopolitical importance continues to grow, Russia’s efforts to assert dominance will face competition from China and the European Union, which have become more active in the region. Putin’s visit to Tajikistan, while symbolically significant, is unlikely to result in any major changes to the region’s power dynamics. Given Russia’s historical approach to the region, characterized by rhetorical commitments rather than substantial investments, it is reasonable to expect that the outcomes of the visit will not significantly alter the balance of power in Central Asia.
The strategic contest for influence in Central Asia remains open, with Moscow striving to maintain its foothold, but facing growing challenges from other global powers.
