On November 15-16, the summit of the heads of state of Central Asia took place in Tashkent in the format of Consultative Meetings, the outcomes of which raised a great number of questions, especially regarding regional integration.
The main outcome of the meeting was the decision to admit Azerbaijan as a full member of the Consultative Meetings, which had been hoped to become a potential institutional basis for the integration of the five Central Asian countries.
Let’s examine the significance of this event, try to determine the potential for regional integration, and also consider the interests of international players.
The Borders of Central Asia and Two Integration Attempts
With Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the format of the Consultative Meetings, many speculations arose about what constitutes the region of Central Asia, where its political borders begin and end, and even attempts were made to categorize Azerbaijan as a part of this region.
If we set aside these speculations, we can assert that Central Asia represents a political region and subsystem of international relations, which includes five countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
This definition was provided by the Central Asian countries themselves in 1993 during a meeting of the leaders of the five former Soviet republics, who introduced the term “Central Asia” in the final communiqué.
These countries, which were once part of a unified economic system in the Soviet era, sought to maintain their unity after the collapse of the USSR to avoid the painful consequences of the collapse.
A process began in the region that can be conditionally called the period of Integration 1.0. During this period, several attempts were made to institutionalize “integration” processes. Institutions like the Central Asian Union (1994-1998), the Central Asian Economic Community (1998-2002), and Central Asian Cooperation (2002-2005) were created.
The latter was dissolved and integrated into the EurAsEC after Russia joined it in 2004.
Thus, the first stage of integration efforts ended in failure.
After Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in Uzbekistan in late 2016, he set the task of opening the country to the world and prioritized Central Asia as a key area of his foreign policy. This began the era of renewed hopes for integration.
At his initiative, in 2018, the Consultative Meetings of heads of state were established, and these were linked to hopes for regional unification. This marked the start of Integration 2.0.
With Azerbaijan’s accession to this format as a full member, it has qualitatively changed and is no longer solely a Central Asian platform.
Some experts are now trying to shape the perception that the Consultative Meetings, despite their qualitative transformation, can still become a unifying factor for Central Asia.
Although it is clear that these meetings will now feature an agenda that goes beyond the regional state, addressing issues and adopting documents that extend beyond Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s inclusion leaves open the question of the future inclusion of more participants (such as Armenia and Afghanistan).
In other words, there remains the possibility of further expansion of the Consultative Meetings and its dilution, and it is even possible that it will be abolished and transformed into something new, as happened with the CAS in 2005.
I believe we must accept the reality that Central Asia is not yet ready to form as a unified and independent region. The outcomes of the recent summit confirm this.
The decision to include Azerbaijan was most likely influenced by the interests of major players and ongoing international processes. In other words, we are adapting to the external agenda and are dependent on it.
But this will be discussed later. Now, let’s try to highlight regional systemic factors that hinder regional integration.
1. The Lack of Complementary Economies
Any integration is based on the complementarity of the economies of the countries involved. In simple terms, economic cooperation requires the presence of capital, technology, natural resources, and labor.
If these components exist in several countries that are willing to exchange resources/advantages and combine them, this can lead to integration and contribute to the development of trade relations and the formation of a common market.
For example, in North America, where the United States has capital and technology, Canada provides raw materials, and Mexico offers labor, cooperation works very effectively and productively.
In Central Asia, there is no factor of economic complementarity. We have raw materials and labor, but we lack capital and technology to create a unified industrial and trade space, production, and exchange. Therefore, we occupy the position of a raw materials region, dependent on external markets and relations, including those oriented towards integration processes with non-regional states.
If we look at statistical evidence of this thesis, we note that, according to data presented by the President of Uzbekistan in his article prior to the Consultative Meeting, the mutual trade turnover between Central Asian countries in 2024 amounted to $11 billion, while the total foreign trade turnover of the region as a whole was $253 billion, which doesn’t even reach 5%.
2. Underdeveloped Communication and Large Neighbors
The situation mentioned above is exacerbated by the lack of a developed regional transport and logistics system and the presence of outdated infrastructure. This factor becomes an obstacle to the development of industry and trade.
The presence of large industrial neighbors such as China and Russia, who supply the region with industrial goods, can also be considered a limiting factor for Central Asian integration.
These countries are not keen on creating manufacturing capacities in Central Asia because they are interested in selling their products. They mainly import raw materials from the region and export industrial goods.
3. The Inability to Ensure Regional Security Independently
Another key component of independent integration is ensuring regional security. Central Asian countries are not able to ensure their own security. In this area, they are heavily dependent on major external players, primarily Russia.
The countries of the region do not have large, powerful armies, a developed military-industrial complex, or the finances to purchase advanced military equipment (not to mention the lack of a nuclear umbrella).
The events in Kazakhstan in January 2022, when Astana turned to the CSTO (i.e., Russia) for internal security support, confirm the inability of Central Asian countries to ensure their own security.
4. The Lack of a Common Identity
Integration also requires a meaningful component that fosters the convergence of peoples and states based on an idea. Of course, all five countries in the region are very close on a cultural and everyday level, and some experts speak of a formed regional identity, but the author believes that such conclusions are premature.
The formation of a regional identity requires more time spent living in an ideological construct (in this case, Central Asia as a region).
We recently lived in a Soviet construct, and before that in other constructs. Even in the Soviet era, which lasted 70 years, a strong ideological construct was never established. People still defined themselves in other constructs, such as Islamic, Turkic, and Persian.
It is possible to form an ideological construct in a short historical time (which can be seen in the ASEAN space), but for this, other components are necessary — economic and military-political. Integration based on these can create a common identity.
What Can Unite Central Asia and Azerbaijan?
The first thing to mention when we talk about the relations between Central Asia and Azerbaijan is the lack of economic complementarity between the sides. Azerbaijan is another resource-based country, producing and exporting raw materials.
This factor cannot create opportunities for close and intensive economic cooperation between Central Asia and Baku.
Statistics confirm this thesis.
Azerbaijan is not among the top five trade partners of any Central Asian country. The sides can only be united by one thing — transit.
Azerbaijan can become a key transit point for exporting raw materials from Central Asia to Europe and a connecting link in the trade processes between China and Europe.
In other words, the relationship between Central Asia and Azerbaijan can be described as a transit mechanism for trade between the West and the East, as well as providing the West with secure access to resources.
Interests of Major Players and International Processes
The transformation of the Consultative Meetings into a six-party format should be considered in the context of the interests of great powers and international processes that likely determined the decision to admit Azerbaijan.
Did the U.S. Influence the Decision?
This year, the U.S. interest in Central Asia has sharply increased, primarily driven by the escalation of U.S.-China relations, which worsened in October, as well as by efforts to contain Moscow and Beijing in the region.
Recall that in October, China used its dominance in critical minerals (accounting for about 70% of global production and over 90% of their processing) by introducing export controls on these resources.
At the end of October, during his tour of Southeast and East Asia, the U.S. president signed several agreements on critical minerals with Japan, Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand to reduce dependence on Beijing, which accounts for 63% of U.S. imports of critical raw materials.
At this moment, he invited Central Asian countries to hold a summit in Washington.
To gain secure access to the region’s resources, Washington needs to promote the development of alternative transit routes in Central Asia bypassing Russia.
In the U.S. Strategy for Central Asia for 2019-2025, which is the latest official document adopted by the U.S. government concerning Central Asia, it speaks about the need to support the development of transport and logistics projects between Central Asia and Europe via the Caucasus.
In Senate hearings in late September 2025, U.S. lawmakers and experts discussed the strategic importance of developing relations between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which are rich in resources. Frederick Starr, a leading expert on Central Asia, noted:
"If the U.S. and its allies do not ensure free and secure access to sea routes for the countries of the region (referring to the three South Caucasus countries — editor’s note) and especially to the Central Asian republics, which possess significant energy resources, they will return under the control of Moscow or Beijing."
In this context, the facilitation of the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia in August 2025 should be considered.
At that time, Baku and Yerevan signed a peace declaration with the mediation of the U.S. president in Washington.
The U.S. gained the right to develop transit routes and cargo flows through the Zangezur Corridor, passing through Armenia and connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan.
The project was named the "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity" (TRIPP).
The author of this article suggests that during the visit of two senior U.S. officials, the U.S. Special Representative for Central and South Asia and the Deputy Secretary of State to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in October 2025, the issue of Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Consultative Meetings format was discussed. The issue was likely also discussed at the highest level between the White House and the leaders of Central Asian countries during the Washington meetings in early November.
Thus, U.S. interests influenced (or determined?) the decision by the Central Asian countries to admit Baku as the sixth member of the Consultative Meetings.
China and Russia’s Reactions
The outcomes of the Tashkent summit should also be viewed from the perspective of the interests of China and Russia.
Beijing may have mixed feelings about this event. On one hand, China, promoting its global geoeconomic project "Belt and Road," is interested in developing the Trans-Caspian international transport route (TCITR) connecting Central Asia with the South Caucasus and further with Turkey and Europe, and may view this event positively.
On the other hand, the strengthening of the position of another Turkic country, actively supporting and promoting Turkic identity in Central Asia, which borders the northwestern territories of China, inhabited by Turkic peoples, may be perceived negatively by Beijing.
Russia views the results of the seventh Consultative Meeting more negatively. Firstly, Moscow, which considers Central Asia its sphere of dominance, is interested in controlling transit routes into the region.
Azerbaijan’s accession, primarily driven by the development of the Trans-Caspian route, is not in Russia’s interests, as it creates opportunities for alternative routes into Central Asia.
Secondly, the outcomes of the Tashkent summit may alter the balance of power in the South Caucasus, as it opens the possibility of closer ties between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Turkey, Europe, and the U.S.
Moscow is jealous of any integration processes in the post-Soviet space without its participation, as it sees this as a potential reduction in its influence.
Turkiye and Iran’s Reactions
For Ankara, the outcomes of the Consultative Meetings are clearly positive. Firstly, it fully aligns with Turkey’s strategy to become an international transit hub, and the development of relations between Central Asia and the South Caucasus creates opportunities for transit development through Turkiye. Ankara will also gain secure access to Central Asia’s resources and markets.
Secondly, Azerbaijan’s accession may strengthen the position of the geocultural project of a united Turkic space, developed and promoted by Turkiye, as it contributes to the geographical, transport-logistical, and trade formation of this space and strengthens Turkic national consciousness.
Iran is likely cautious, as it fears any increase in the presence of NATO countries (the U.S., Turkey, and the EU) on its northern borders.
Tehran viewed the TRIPP project very negatively. Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Consultative Meetings of Central Asian heads of state could facilitate the development of this project, expand NATO’s access to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and ultimately bring them closer.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a few fundamental conclusions can be drawn from the outcomes of the seventh Consultative Meeting and the potential for integration in Central Asia:
1. Azerbaijan’s accession as a full member of the Consultative Meetings led to a setback in integration in Central Asia, as this platform could have become an institutional basis for integration processes in the region.
2. The decision to admit Azerbaijan was made under the influence of major players and international processes, which proves that the ongoing processes in Central Asia are dependent on the external agenda to which the countries of the region are adjusting.
3. The results of the Tashkent summit confirmed that for the countries of Central Asia, developing integration processes with external players is more of a priority than regional integration.
4. Central Asia lacks the economic and military-political factors and incentives for integration and cooperation.
5. In Central Asia, the interests of major international players are closely intertwined, and they can influence the decision-making processes regarding regional matters and react to them.
