The dismissal of Kamchybek Tashiyev from his posts as Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) has become one of the most significant political developments of early 2026 — not only for Kyrgyzstan, but for the wider region. President Sadyr Japarov and Tashiyev rose to power together following the resignation of the previous president in late 2020, quickly emerging as key political allies. After the adoption of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers in October 2021, the GKNB chairman simultaneously assumed the position of deputy head of the Cabinet. Such an arrangement is rare in the region and granted Tashiyev powers that extended well beyond traditional security functions. In addition to overseeing and coordinating law enforcement agencies, he increasingly intervened in economic and social policy matters, areas previously outside the GKNB’s remit.
Tajik journalist Kosim Bekmuhammad shared his analysis of the unfolding situation within Kyrgyzstan’s political establishment. According to him, Tashiyev’s broad authority made him the most influential figure in the government, with many officials believing that their positions depended on personal loyalty to the GKNB chief. In essence, he appeared to be constructing a “state within a state.”
The presidential decree dismissing Tashiyev had what observers described as a “lightning-bolt effect” across political circles both in Kyrgyzstan and beyond. Commenting on his decision, President Japarov stated that his primary objective was to preserve stability, calm, and national unity.
Immediately after Tashiyev’s removal, several key figures associated with him were also dismissed, including all his deputies and the head of the GKNB’s main directorate in Bishkek, followed by regional heads. They were replaced by new appointees. At the same time, Japarov initiated structural reforms within the GKNB: the Border Service was separated from the committee, and the 9th Service was transformed into a State Protection Service directly subordinate to the president.
Tashiyev, reportedly caught off guard by the news while in Germany, returned to Bishkek on the night of February 13. Some observers suggested he might retain a degree of influence, but within days there were no visible signs of his former political weight. On February 16, Japarov confirmed in an interview with Kabar agency that he had met with Tashiyev, stating: “We will remain friends. But he will not return to public office. Let him rest and focus on his health.” The statement effectively marked the end of what many have called the “Tashiyev era.”
A failed experiment in dual power
When the north-south political alliance of “Japarov–Tashiyev” came to power more than five years ago, it seemed one would play the role of the “soft hand” (political leadership) and the other the “hard hand” (security enforcement). Over time, however, this complementary formula evolved into latent rivalry, resulting in the emergence of two power centers.
At times, Tashiyev appeared to wield greater influence over government officials and members of parliament than the president himself. Loyalty to him was widely seen as a guarantee of political survival. No other state official received as much media coverage as Tashiyev.
In recent weeks, social media was abuzz with speculation about the possibility of Tashiyev running in the next presidential election. These discussions intensified after 75 political and public figures called for early elections, further highlighting what many perceived as his political ambitions.
The voluntary resignation of parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu immediately after Tashiyev’s dismissal also pointed to backstage maneuvering. Had Japarov failed to act decisively, Tashiyev’s extensive administrative base might have enabled a realistic transformation of “figure No. 2 into figure No. 1.”
Central Asian history demonstrates that parallel centers of power often lead to crisis. Kazakhstan provides a recent example: after Kassym-Jomart Tokayev became president in 2019, some officials continued to take cues not from the presidential residence but from the office of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. This duality intensified elite competition and contributed to the January 2022 crisis. Kazakhstan restored stability only after consolidating authority under a single center of power.
Japarov, likely mindful of this precedent, appears to have moved to eliminate dualism before the 2027 presidential election could evolve into open confrontation. Continued dominance of the security apparatus by Tashiyev risked turning the GKNB into an active political actor — a development fundamentally at odds with its institutional role.
By removing Tashiyev, Japarov sent a clear signal to the political elite: there is now only one center of power, and those who wish to remain within the system must adapt to the new rules.
Could instability follow?
A key question is whether Tashiyev’s sudden dismissal could affect Kyrgyzstan’s internal stability. The balance between northern and southern elites has historically been delicate. If his removal is framed as the “displacement of southerners,” it could inject regional tension into the upcoming presidential campaign.
Japarov’s interview with Kabar suggests he is aware of this risk. He emphasized efforts to prevent regional polarization, including appointing officials from the north to posts in the south and vice versa — a practice he intends to expand.
Meanwhile, media reports indicate that Tashiyev has already left Kyrgyzstan. It is possible this decision followed his meeting with Japarov. Some analysts speculate that Tashiyev may have agreed to avoid open political confrontation in exchange for avoiding investigations into his tenure at the GKNB.
His absence could ease tensions within the ruling elite and reduce uncertainty within the security sector. However, his unimpeded departure may also signal to supporters that he remains politically intact and capable of maneuvering.
Still, Tashiyev’s ability to influence Kyrgyz politics from abroad appears limited. He lacks strong external backing, and political dynamics in Kyrgyzstan are largely domestically driven.
With less than a year until the next presidential election, Japarov will likely seek to highlight the benefits of the so-called “post-Tashiyev period” — improved manageability of the security apparatus, reduced elite turbulence, fewer high-profile cases, socio-economic initiatives, and potentially a softer approach toward the media.
Such measures would allow the president to frame the transition as a move toward greater stability and predictability.
External stakeholders
Central Asian countries have generally welcomed the elimination of a parallel power center. Russia, a key strategic partner, is reportedly satisfied with the consolidation of presidential authority.
China’s primary concern remains Kyrgyzstan’s stability and the effective functioning of its institutions, ensuring no obstacles arise for bilateral and regional projects.
Turkiye, while attentive to personal relationships with influential leaders, typically avoids involvement in internal elite conflicts that could undermine broader Turkic integration. Ankara is likely to deepen its engagement directly with Japarov.
The United States and the European Union are expected to view developments through the lens of their strategic competition with Moscow and Beijing. For both, Kyrgyzstan’s commitments regarding the use of critical natural resources remain central, seen as a means of balancing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence.
Conclusion
The dismissal of Kamchybek Tashiyev has ended a complex period of dual power in Kyrgyzstan. The episode underscores a broader regional lesson: in Central Asian political systems, the existence of two competing centers of authority almost inevitably leads to crisis.
With this move, Japarov not only strengthened his personal position but also delivered a clear message to the political elite — the rules of the game have changed, and from now on, there is only one center of power.
