Donald Trump attempts to solve the problem of the lack of an acceptable exit from the war with Iran. Instead of the promised “hell” and “destruction of civilization,” he preferred to sign a two-week truce proposed by mediators from Pakistan. The terms of the ceasefire were unclear for some time (probably even to the signatories themselves). When each side announced its interpretation of these terms, the truce immediately ended.
Iran once again closed the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic, just hours after lifting its blockade. Negotiations scheduled for April 11 are at risk of falling apart, as Washington and Tehran’s positions do not align on any point, and both sides consider themselves victors. As a result, Trump will once again have to consider escalation options that could lead his coalition to a successful exit from the war on their own terms.
What happened in the last 24 hours and why didn’t Trump escalate?
The main point: there was neither “hell” in Iran and the countries of the Persian Gulf, nor (so far) a stable truce.
Donald Trump tried to solve the problem of the Strait of Hormuz, which was effectively blocked by Iran (through demonstrative strikes on tankers in the strait itself, as well as in the Persian and Oman Gulfs, which the strait connects). It was also necessary to stop Iran’s strikes on the infrastructure of neighboring states, including oil and gas infrastructure.
Trump had two fundamentally different approaches available to solve these problems:
- escalation: a ground operation, forceful escort of tanker convoys, or massive strikes on Iranian energy and transport—or the threat of such strikes;
- de-escalation, meaning a return to negotiations.
Obviously, the US administration considered forceful options: several thousand army and marine personnel were deployed to the Arabian Sea and the countries of the Persian Gulf, along with landing craft and dock equipment. Additional naval forces were likely concentrated in the region. However, there is no precise data on the number of ships that arrived in the Arabian Sea, which could be used both to ensure marine landings and to escort tanker convoys.
All these options have the same drawbacks: organizing convoys, landing on Iranian shores and islands carries risks of losses for the army and navy and does not guarantee that the safety of shipping will be fully restored.
At the same time, Trump tried to force Iran into negotiations by threatening massive strikes on civilian infrastructure. Naturally, carrying out the threat itself would not bring the opening of the strait and/or the cessation of Iranian bombings closer. Moreover, there was a good chance of the opposite effect: Tehran promised to respond with strikes on similar targets in the Persian Gulf countries. However, as the Trump administration likely believed, even the threats of “destroying civilization” would force Iran into greater compromises.
A few hours before the deadline set by Trump as the beginning of “hell” for Iran, the parties agreed on a two-week truce and agreed to hold peace talks—not directly, but through a mediator in the form of Pakistan’s leadership. No formal documents were apparently signed, allowing opponents to interpret the agreement as they wished.
Initially, there were problems with the agenda of the future negotiations: both sides insisted on taking their (mutually exclusive) proposals as the basis of the agreement. Then the truce itself was effectively canceled.
- Tehran insisted that it would only agree to a ceasefire if Israel stopped attacks on pro-Iranian Hezbollah proxies in Lebanon. The US and Israel said the agreement does not apply to Lebanon.
- Additionally, Iran demanded that Washington recognize its “right to enrich uranium” before negotiations, meaning the continuation of its nuclear program in one form or another. For the Trump administration, which started the war on the pretext of needing to completely destroy this program, this demand is absolutely unacceptable.
The Strait of Hormuz was “opened” for a few hours, after which Tehran declared it closed again and withdrew from negotiations. During this time, only four tankers managed to exit the Persian Gulf.
Hostilities resumed: Israel continued its offensive in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah; someone (we’ll discuss one version of who below) launched an airstrike on an Iranian oil refinery; Iran struck targets in the UAE and a Saudi pipeline supplying oil to a Red Sea port—the only available way to export energy resources from Saudi Arabia bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.
By the end of the first day of the truce, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (considered by the US to be the de facto leader of the country) declared that without a truce in Lebanon and US recognition of “uranium enrichment rights,” the negotiations scheduled for April 11 are meaningless. US Vice President J.D. Vance responded that “it’s stupid, but that’s [the desire to continue fighting over the situation in Lebanon]—Iran’s choice.”
How did it happen that Trump can’t seem to end the war?
The mistake was made during the planning of the operation. It’s difficult to determine exactly what Donald Trump was counting on, but we can try to reconstruct his plan from subsequent actions.
The exact goals of the war were reformulated several times, but one point remained unchanged: Washington intended to achieve the complete cancellation of Iran’s military nuclear program. The method chosen to achieve this goal was an air campaign; a ground operation was not planned in any form: the US not only failed to concentrate the necessary troops before initiating strikes but also evacuated naval forces and most personnel from bases in the Persian Gulf zone to avoid losses.
It was clear in advance that it was impossible to destroy the remnants of the nuclear program with air and missile strikes alone: all its parts that could be destroyed were already destroyed during the previous campaign in June 2025. The program’s resumption and the creation of new capacities (including in shelters buried a hundred meters or more deep) are inevitable as long as the political leadership of Iran wills it.
Accordingly, the problem of the nuclear program could only be solved by changing the political leadership or its capitulation on this critical issue (excluding the option of diplomatic control over the program, which was promoted by the Democratic Party and categorically rejected by Trump). Most likely, the US and Israel hoped for a regime change to a more negotiable one, starting the war with a decapitation strike.
In case of failure of this ambitious plan (i.e., the preservation of a hostile regime in Tehran persisting in its desire to continue nuclear development), the US and Israeli authorities likely intended to halt bombings at a convenient moment for themselves—just as they did in June 2025 during the previous attempt to destroy the Islamic Republic’s nuclear assets. This approach aligns well with Israel’s strategic doctrine of “mowing the lawn” (or “trimming the grass”).
What is this doctrine?
However, Iran executed a counterplan depriving the US of the ability to simply leave the battlefield after inflicting significant losses on the enemy—and with the threat of repeating the operation in some time. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz put the world on the brink of an energy and food crisis (due to a fertilizer shortage).
No matter how much Washington would like to shift the solution of this problem to energy and fertilizer consumers in Asia or NATO allies, only it (if possible at all) can force Tehran to lift the blockade. Strikes on targets in the Persian Gulf countries also compel the US to continue fighting to protect allies.
Simple escalation (in this case, increasing the intensity of strikes) is difficult to change the situation. A ground or naval operation is risky and does not guarantee the restoration of safe navigation and the reduction of Iranian missile and drone attack intensity to an acceptable level.
Didn’t Trump know that Iran has an effective counterplan?
The US President claims that his administration was surprised and shocked by the strikes on the infrastructure of allies in the Gulf. As for the closure of the strait, he allegedly “warned about it long ago,” but believed that destroying the Iranian navy would solve the problem.
However, it is known that the Trump administration was informed about the Iranian plan. In 2025, the US intelligence community (which includes representatives of all agencies with intelligence units—from the CIA to the Treasury) in an open report on threats to the country, indicated that in the event of an escalation, Iran would likely strike Gulf countries and close the strait (in the latter case, intelligence clarified that minelayers, submarines, and small boats would be used for this purpose). The Trump administration likely assumed that powerful strikes on Iranian missile arsenals and bases, mobile launchers, and ships would eliminate these risks.
This clearly shows poor study of the Russian-Ukrainian war experience: despite having no combat ships, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet using sea drones and long-range UAVs in the enclosed Black Sea waters, occasionally disrupting Russian shipping and energy resource loading. Iran replicated this strategy, reinforcing it with verbal attacks: along with a couple of dozen real drone strikes on tankers, there are messages (via radio) to ship crews about inevitable attacks if unauthorized passage through the strait occurs or that the fairway is mined. It is unknown whether such mining has actually been conducted; most specialized minelayers have been sunk by US airstrikes.
In any case, the “closure” of the strait proved quite reliable: few dare to pass without Iran’s permission. Permission is granted to tankers carrying Iranian and Iraqi oil (in the last few days), as well as ships from other “friendly” countries that have paid a “fee” of one dollar per barrel of oil.
So, is a truce impossible? And what else can Trump do to ensure victory?
In its current form, the conflict has all the signs of a war of attrition. Both sides believe they are at least not losing. And they present to the public clearly inflated estimates of their successes and combat capability.
For instance, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Kane stated that the US and Israel destroyed almost all missile installations, missile production factories, and Shahed-type drone production capacities—not to mention naval ships, mine stockpiles, etc.
Iran, as reported by Pakistani mediators, claimed to be winning the war, as it still possesses 15,000 ballistic missiles reserves and tens of thousands of drones—almost an order of magnitude more than the most optimistic pre-war estimates of its potential by independent experts.
In recent weeks, Iran has been launching 30–40 missiles and 40–60 long-range UAVs a day at targets throughout the Middle East. The consistency in the scale of these salvos clearly indicates that Tehran is not experiencing critical problems caused by opponents’ strikes on missile bases but is trying to economize and ration ammunition consumption. If pre-war estimates are to be believed, Iran’s missile and drone stockpile should have lasted 1–2 months of fighting at the current intensity. However, Tehran is maintaining the “schedule” of strikes, and there are no signs of its exhaustion.
The US and Israel face similar problems: most of the stocks of the most effective munitions and interceptor missiles capable of hitting Iranian ballistic missiles will be depleted in a couple of months (assuming the current rate of exchange of strikes is maintained). Of course, even then, the US can continue hostilities, relying on less effective (and more risky in terms of combat aircraft losses) solutions. Already, a significant portion of US aviation uses conventional bombs with JDAM satellite navigation planning and correction systems. Their use in most cases implies the presence of aircraft over Iranian territory with all the accompanying risks.
The situation where the parties to the conflict consider themselves victors and seek guarantees of consolidating their victory is described in scientific literature dedicated to the end of wars from a game theory perspective. Initially, the parties must obtain the missing information about the balance of forces with the opponent as a result of hostilities. Obviously, this moment of truth in the US-Iran conflict has not yet arrived.
The outcome of the confrontation depends on the share of resources each side is willing to commit. While the regime in Tehran is involved in an existential war, Washington continues to conduct a limited air operation. If this mode is maintained, the US will have to make significant concessions just to “exit” the war. Obviously, Tehran intends to extract the maximum from its current status as the “master of the Strait of Hormuz.”
With increased involvement in the war (and escalation), the chances of a favorable outcome for the US will increase—as will the risks of losses. Among the options for using naval, marine, and ground forces, an assault on the Iranian islands in the Strait of Hormuz using large naval forces (dozens of destroyers with advanced air defense systems) is the most suitable for solving current problems.
Armies from the Persian Gulf countries may likely participate in such an attack (these countries do not intend to pay the “fee” for tanker passage through the strait). As reported by Iranian media, UAE aviation attacked an Iranian oil refinery on Lavan Island immediately after the truce was announced.
The two-week truce may be just a facade for both sides. Behind it lies the desire to intensify hostilities. Judging by the deployment of forces to the Middle East, the US may still be planning a risky combined naval and marine operation to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
