In a stunning move, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov on February 10, 2026, dismissed his political ally and close friend, Kamchybek Tashiev, from his positions as Deputy Prime Minister and head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). Following this decision, Tashiyev's deputies also left their posts.
Additionally, Japarov transferred the responsibility for the security of high-ranking officials and key facilities from the GKNB to a newly created entity—the State Guard Service—directly subordinating it to himself. This move has sparked speculation about the future implications for the Japarov regime, as analyzed by Daniil Kislov, director of the international news agency Fergana.Media.
ИЗОБРАЖЕНИЕ Daniil Kislov; photo Fergana
Tashiyev and Japarov are not just friends but political partners who played key roles in the 2020 revolution that ousted the previous regime. Following the revolution, Tashiyev became Japarov’s right-hand man, heading the GKNB and effectively controlling the country’s security forces. The duo's alliance has long been based on mutual interests, but beneath their strong friendship, tensions had been simmering—tensions that have now led to a break.
Ambitions and competition
One of the main reasons for the split lies in personal ambitions and competition. Tashiyev, who was popular among nationalists, security forces, and southern elites, increasingly positioned himself as a rival power center. In recent years, he openly criticized ministers and even interfered in economic matters, causing friction with Japarov.
Japarov, who consolidated power through constitutional reforms and suppression of the opposition, began to see Tashiyev as a threat, particularly with rumors circulating that Tashiyev was preparing for a presidential run in 2027. In Kyrgyz politics, friendships often end where the struggle for power begins, and Japarov likely decided to eliminate a potential rival before Tashiyev gained too much influence.
Key issues and diverging approaches
Another factor in the split was their differing approaches to key issues. While both shared similar goals, their methods often clashed. Tashiyev, as head of the GKNB, took a more radical approach, cracking down on opposition but also targeting clans close to the president. His stance on the Tajikistan border issue was particularly hardline, leading to conflicts and losses, while Japarov seemed more open to finding compromises for the sake of Kyrgyzstan’s international image.
Economic disagreements also played a role. Tashiyev’s anti-corruption campaigns reportedly affected business interests tied to Japarov’s family and allies. Insider leaks from Kyrgyz Telegram channels hint at a scandal surrounding infrastructure contracts, with Tashiyev allegedly blocking deals that would have benefitted Japarov’s inner circle. What once was a friendship now seemed more like a reluctant partnership, fraying at the edges.
ИЗОБРАЖЕНИЕ
Health issues and strategic timing
A third key factor was Tashiyev’s health and his absence from the country. He was in Germany for medical treatment—reportedly for heart issues—since late January 2026, providing Japarov with a convenient opportunity to act. Tashiyev’s physical absence meant he could not resist or mobilize his supporters.
This is a classic tactic used by authoritarian regimes: removing an opponent while they are vulnerable. Although rumors of poisoning or forced treatment are circulating, they remain unsubstantiated. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Tashiyev’s dismissal was carried out in his absence, underscoring the urgency and potential fear of a rebellion within the GKNB.
Simultaneously, three of Tashiyev’s deputies were dismissed, signaling a purge of his faction within the security services. The appointment of Jumgalbek Shabdanbekov as acting head of the GKNB is seen as a strategic move by Japarov to install a loyal, temporary figure without the charisma or independence of his predecessor.
Why this move was necessary
Japarov’s decision to remove Tashiyev was crucial for consolidating his own power. Tashiev had become too influential, and Japarov likely wanted to prevent a potential coup. Tashiyev’s health problems provided a perfect pretext for this move. Had he been in Kyrgyzstan, Tashiev might have resisted, relying on loyal security forces or media support.
What’s next?
Tashiyev’s dismissal marks a ticking time bomb for Japarov’s regime. Over the next few months, widespread purges in the security forces are likely. The GKNB, a key instrument in maintaining control over all branches of government, will be staffed with fully loyal individuals. However, this may provoke discontent among officers loyal to Tashiyev, leading to potential arrests or “voluntary” resignations in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the military as Japarov seeks to suppress any potential rebellion.
If Tashiyev returns to Kyrgyzstan, he could very well shift to opposition. With his strong popularity in the southern regions, particularly Osh and Jalal-Abad, Tashiyev has the ability to mobilize protests.
This situation mirrors the 2020 revolution, where Tashiyev played a key role in bringing Japarov to power. Now, Tashiyev risks becoming a “victim of the regime.” However, if Japarov plays hardball—through arrest or accusations of corruption—Tashiyev may choose exile, following in the footsteps of many Kyrgyz opposition figures before him.
Public discontent is already growing, with inflation, corruption, and media suppression all contributing to the disillusionment. Tashiyev’s dismissal is likely to exacerbate societal polarization: nationalists may see it as betrayal, while the opposition will use it as evidence of the regime’s authoritarian nature.
The future of Kyrgyz politics
I have met with Kamchybek Tashiev personally several times between 2010 and 2011, and I have always thought he was not someone who would simply let go of power. In my view, there are two possibilities. Either his dismissal is the result of a calculated agreement between him and Japarov, and Tashiev has received significant compensation, with no further consequences. Or, Tashiev was blindsided by the move, and he will feel deeply insulted, creating significant political fallout for Japarov. In the second scenario, we could see yet another “revolution.”
There is, however, an unexpected theory: a political “swap.” In early February 2026, 75 prominent figures in Kyrgyzstan—scientists, former prime ministers, ex-MPs, and public figures—called for early presidential elections. Their argument is based on the fact that Japarov was elected under the old constitution, which implied a six-year term, but the new constitution reduced presidential powers to five years. According to the signatories, early elections are needed to “avoid various interpretations and public disputes” and to “give new momentum to Kyrgyzstan’s development.”
Some in Bishkek are speculating that Japarov and Tashiyev have struck a deal: Tashiyev will run for president and, likely, win—without using administrative resources. Japarov would then become his prime minister, and their partnership would continue in a new form.
ИЗОБРАЖЕНИЕ Sherali Kabir, the Minister of Industry and New Technologies of Tajikistan
