DUSHANBE, March 30, 2017, Asia-Plus — Security situation in Central Asia, influence of Russia and the strengthening of China’s role in the region, as well as the US policy under Trump for Central Asia — these and other key issues were discussed in an interview of CAAN with Dr. Richard Weitz, the Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Military Center Political analysis at the Hudson Institute. Dr. Weitz is also an Expert at Wikistrat and a non-resident Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign and defense policies.
How do you assess the security situation in Central Asia, what risks remain relevant in 2017?
The security challenges for Central Asia for 2017 remain as in previous years: combatting internal terrorism and religious extremism without antagonizing religious or other groups; resource management (water especially); countering the adverse impact of disorders in the Middle East and Afghanistan from destabilizing Central Asian countries; expanding inter-state cooperation on many issues; balancing the risk of Sino-Russian collusion or confrontation but also great power indifference (want “goldilocks” of not too much or too little foreign attention); preventing domestic political transitions from leading to conflicts that could threaten other countries’ security and lead to foreign military intervention; and curbing the proliferation of WMD, narcotics, humans, and arms.
Transnational criminal organizations exploit the region’s porous frontiers, corrupt border services, and the illegal routes move illegal migrants and other exploited people across national frontiers. For example, Central Asia serves as a nexus for a thriving narcotics trade emanating from Afghanistan. Drug smugglers funnel heroin and opium from Afghanistan through the “Northern Route,” passing through Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to final destinations in Europe and Russia. Drugs also flow into China and Iran. Central Asian law enforcement agencies have increased training and resources to combat the drug problem, but narcotics production and trafficking volumes remain high. The political transition in Uzbekistan has proceeded with surprising stability, but Kazakhstan will face a similar challenge in coming years.
The role of external powers in regional security issues has been constantly changing. The last few years has seen a sharp drawdown in U.S. military activities in Central Asia, which has induced Russia but not China to increase its regional security management. During the past few years, Moscow has been establishing new bases in Central Asia and providing the local militaries with subsidized training and equipment. Russia has also been leading the drive to strengthen the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and all the Central Asian states except neutral Turkmenistan. But the Ukraine conflict has reduced the Russian attention and efforts in Central Asia, though China has begun selling weapons to the region. India and Iran may expand their security roles in the region in coming years, but Moscow and Beijing will remain the dominant security actors.
How do you assess Putin’s last visit to the Central Asian region? Does Russia’s role as a guarantor of security in the region (especially in the light of the events in Ukraine) change (increases or decreases)?
Since Putin became president, Russia has been striving to enhance its influence in Central Asia, with some success. Putin’s short visit on this occasion had several goals. First, Putin wanted to assess the political situation in the countries he visited, especially the impact of the political transition in Uzbekistan following the death of President Karimov (such as with the newly announced reforms in Kazakhstan).
Second, Putin wanted to reaffirm the importance for Moscow of the Eurasian Economic Union and Russian security guarantees through the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Recent events—such as the growing economic influence of China, the slowing of the Russian economy due to sanctions, and the spat between Russia and Belarus—have called both Russian-led projects into question.
Of course, the relative importance of these concerns varied depending on Putin’s interlocutor. In Kazakhstan, he focused on economic issues, while in Tajikistan, he likely concentrated more on security issues. There were also special issues in the agenda for each country. For example, in Kazakhstan, the discussion likely also concerned the Syrian peace talks.
Can we assume that China will strengthen its role in the field of security in the region — for example, to protect its investments?
China’s security presence in Central Asia is growing due to Beijing’s expanding stake in the region as well as the overall growth in PRC foreign policy activism and security capabilities. In the past two decades, China has forged strong economic links with Central Asian countries that generally welcome the opportunity to diversify their commercial ties. China now imports much energy from Central Asia and the region is crucial to China’s Silk Road Economic Belt project.
China’s regional security concerns have also risen due to continued instability in nearby Afghanistan, the expansion of Islamist extremism, and expectations of a NATO military drawdown in the region. The August 2016 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek is a recent example of regional terrorist attacks on Chinese targets in Central Asia. China’s economic stake in Afghanistan has grown, but the main PRC problem is the potential for insecurity there to infect Beijing’s more significant economic and security stakes in Central Asia. As China has increased its economic projects in Central Asia and Afghanistan, moreover, Beijing has expressed concern about the safety of Chinese compatriots in the region since the importance of protecting Chinese citizens abroad has become a more prominent feature of the country’s As a result of these developments, China has expanded its regional security engagement, especially with Central Asian countries bordering the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
So far, China has been content to let the United States and Russia assume primary responsibility for defending China’s military security interests in the region. For example, Beijing has shown little interest in strengthening the defense functions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which counts all the Central Asian countries (except for Turkmenistan) as full members. As a result, the SCO has less defense capacity than the CSTO.
Instead, China has focused on promoting its counterterrorism, energy security, and other nontraditional security goals. Chinese security assistance, though modest, now goes to all five Central Asian states. For example, Beijing has been working with Moscow and other actors to engage with the Afghan Taliban and secure regional transportation routes.
However, China’s main security contribution is arguably its role in promoting Central Asia’s economic development and integration. If the OBOR succeeds, Central Asian economic opportunities could grow substantially, giving the local regimes more money to spend on their security forces as well as social services. However, China has recently begun to sell some weapons to Turkmenistan, which is not a CSTO member, and may assume a more prominent security role in the future if Russia and its allied regimes prove unable to maintain regional security and Beijing fears the consequences.
What do you think about ongoing discussions of the role (reform of the mandate) of the CSTO, which suggest rapid intervention in the event of internal unrest?
Following major enhancements before 2014, the CSTO’s development has stagnated in recent years. Moscow has been preoccupied with its military operations in Ukraine and Syria, which CSTO members have made clear fall outside its mandate. There was some speculation that the CSTO might have intervened if the political transition in Uzbekistan spilled over and disrupted political stability in CSTO members, but this did not occur. The CSTO’s September 2015 summit was devoted to countering the threat of Islamist terrorism, mainly the IS, in Central Asia. CSTO leaders expressed fear that extremists would spread from Afghanistan to other states. If NATO ever pulls its remaining troops out of Afghanistan, the CSTO may have to deepen its role in that country, but for now, its Afghan agenda has focused on containing the spread of terrorism and narcotics trafficking beyond Afghanistan’s borders, into Central Asia.
What is your attitude to the fact that some security threats are increasingly being used by local regimes for their own purposes (for suppressing or intimidating the population)? What would be the consequences?
Some Central Asian officials may be exaggerating the threat of regional terrorism to justify repressing their domestic political opponents and independent civil society, but there is no clear evidence that this pattern has become more prominent recently. What has changed is that the previous focus on al-Qaeda and the IMU has been replaced by a new public emphasis on the threat from the so-called Islamic State. Of course, the Islamic State is a major terrorist group whose activities threaten many countries. If it establishes a major presence in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia and China would face a major threat. But so far, its influence in Central Asia itself appears marginal, and its Central Asian members are dying in large numbers in Iraq and Syria.
In your opinion, how will the US policy under Trump change with regard to Central Asia? Central Asia was included in the program of the Republican Party of the U.S., which calls «the government and our allies to work to integrate the Central Asian republics into the world economy by providing foreign investments that can stimulate market and political reforms and strengthen the rule of law».
U.S. engagement in Central Asia has historically been limited, due primarily to geography (distance from the United States and proximity of Russia). The one exception was the decade following the 2001 terrorist attacks. Since these were launched from terrorists based in Afghanistan, the U.S. military intervention in that country also elevated the U.S. security concerns and activities in neighboring Central Asia. Although the U.S. military presence has been declining in recent years, U.S. diplomacy remained active thanks to Secretary of State John Kerry’s interest in the region, but that will now change.
The Trump administration does not yet appear to have formulated its policy toward Central Asia. Neither the president nor his senior appointments have shown much interest in the region. Normally, this would result in the mid-level political appointees shaping US policy toward the region, but the National Security Council does not have a director for the region, and the positions responsible for the region in the State and Defense Departments have not yet been filled.
I would expect that, as soon as these posts are filled, the administration will undertake a policy review for the region that will encompass political, economic, and other U.S. goals. Traditionally, the U.S. agenda for Central Asia has included countering WMD proliferation; securing borders from terrorists and other transnational threats; advancing U.S. economic interests; promoting good governance and civil liberties; monitoring Russian, Chinese and Iranian activities in the region; and pursuing bilateral cooperation with each regional state.
The challenges facing U.S. policy in the region includes the already low and still decreasing U.S. military and economic attention and resources in the region compared to other external players (like Russia and China, Japan); Russian and Chinese hostility to a long-term U.S. military presence in Eurasia; local governments’ concern about U.S. democracy and human rights promotion combined with U.S. concern about state repression of civil society and limited rule of law and pervasive corruption; an undeveloped U.S. policy regarding the SCO, the ODOR, the EEU, and other regional institutions; limited U.S. regional policy coordination with other countries, even U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, who themselves are not heavily engaged in regional security issues (as opposed to their silk road transportation focus); the lack of congressional or other influential U.S. domestic champions of greater U.S. involvement in the region; and the general U.S. business indifference or ignorance regarding regional commercial opportunities beyond the energy sector. Although some Central Asians protested the U.S. efforts to change their domestic politics, others will now see some U.S. policies (like the travel ban) as anti-Muslim.+
In this tension between broad U.S. goals and limited U.S. resources, the constraints have normally been more important, resulting in limited U.S. engagement on selective issues, such as strengthening border security, promoting legal reform, enhancing regional cooperation on water and transportation issues, and other niche issues. If U.S. government non-military spending declines by 30 percent, as proposed by the Trump administration, U.S. activities will decline even further unless some shock like another 9/11 leads to greater U.S. interest in the region. This will cause a major challenge for a Trump White House that might want to engage in the transactional deal making but will lack much to offer.
With the declining U.S. military presence in Central Asia—and given the national security priorities of the current White House administration—future U.S. policy toward the region may well mostly reflect the Trump administration’s priorities regarding Russia and China. It remains open whether U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese interactions in Central Asia will be cooperative, competitive, or marginal due to limited U.S. regional engagement.
