According to a new study, over the past three decades, the US has inflicted a staggering $10 trillion in damage to the world due to its colossal greenhouse gas emissions heating the planet. A quarter of this economic blow has hit the United States itself, writes The Guardian.
As the largest source of carbon emissions in history, the US has done more harm to the global economy than any other country. According to the study’s findings, it surpasses even China, the current leader in emissions, which since 1990 has caused a $9 trillion damage to global GDP.
About 25% of this GDP growth slowdown occurred within the US itself, but other countries have paid an even higher price: economic losses are disproportionately felt in the poorest nations. The study showed that since 1990, US emissions have cost India’s economy about $500 billion and Brazil’s $330 billion.
Protesters took to the streets against the global energy conference S&P 2026 in Houston, Texas, on March 23. Photo: Ronaldo Schemidt, AFP
“These are colossal numbers,” acknowledged Marshall Burke, an environmental scientist from Stanford University, who led the new study.
Burke added that the US “bears a significant responsibility: our emissions have caused damage not only to ourselves but also considerable harm to other parts of the world.”
Like a death by a thousand cuts…
The study, published on March 25 in the journal Nature, attempts to quantify in monetary terms the notion of “loss and damage.” This term is used to describe the harm inflicted on societies due to the dangerous rise in global temperatures caused by burning fossil fuels.
Developing countries are calling on wealthier nations, which have emitted most of the greenhouse gases since the industrial revolution, to provide them with financial assistance. These funds are necessary to combat the consequences of catastrophic heatwaves, floods, droughts, and crop failures exacerbated by rising temperatures.
The new study sums up this damage by calculating how much global warming has limited GDP growth and distributing responsibility among countries based on their emissions since 1990. This metric does not account for all the consequences of climate change but shows how economies suffer from heat that reduces workers’ productivity and overburdens healthcare systems.
Photo: Rafael Urdaneta Rojas
“If you raise the temperature a little, as clear historical experience shows, economic growth will slow,” Burke explained. “If you accumulate these effects over 30 years, you will see really significant changes at the end of this period. It’s like death by a thousand cuts. And the people who suffer are not the ones who caused the problem, which seems extremely unfair.”
Gernot Wagner, a climate economist at Columbia Business School, noted: “Past emissions accumulate quickly, and the damage from them even faster. Paying the full social cost of carbon for future CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions pays off many times over.”
The US shirks its commitments
The United States of America has long resisted the idea of legal responsibility for pollution that heats the planet, which has helped push the world towards unprecedented climate conditions in the history of human civilization.
Donald Trump accelerated this shirking of commitments: he withdrew the US from the “loss and damage” fund created to help vulnerable countries and exited global climate agreements. Trump advocates a “drill, baby, drill” approach to oil and gas extraction and takes unprecedented measures to slow down domestic clean energy projects.
Donald Trump. Photo: Reuters
“I don’t think our numbers can bring the Trump administration back to the negotiating table on loss and damage issues, but they certainly suggest that it should,” said Marshall Burke.
Frances Moore, an expert on the social costs of the climate crisis at the University of California, Davis, who was not involved in the study, called the work “useful” but noted that it might still not fully account for the burden of damage incurred by the poorest countries due to a climate crisis they did not cause.
“Many economists argue that the welfare consequences when a very poor person loses a dollar are much more severe than for a wealthier person,” she explained. “This difference in the impact of dollar damage on welfare in rich versus poor countries is not captured in this study.”
The Minister of Defense of Tajikistan Emomali Sobirzoda held a phone conversation yesterday with Majid Ibni Reza, the acting Minister of Defense of Iran, reports the Iranian state broadcasting company.
According to the source, during the conversation, Sobirzoda emphasized the importance of “establishing true peace and stability” for Iran and “the people who share a common language, culture, and civilization.”
Majid Ibni Reza expressed gratitude for the political stance and humanitarian aid of Tajikistan, “provided in support of the state and people of Iran.”
A humanitarian convoy of 110 heavy trucks left Dushanbe for Iran on March 18. The total volume of the cargo amounted to 3,610 tons, including 45 tons of medicines, sanitary and hygiene products, children’s clothing, foodstuffs, essential items, bedding, tents, construction materials, and other necessary goods.
Previously, the US announced its readiness for a two-week ceasefire with Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on the social network Truth Social that Washington agreed to a bilateral ceasefire with Iran for a period of two weeks. According to him, the decision was made after negotiations with the Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahbaz Sharif and the Commander-in-Chief of the country’s ground forces Asim Munir.
Trump noted that the US is ready to suspend strikes on the condition of the full, immediate, and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Soon, the agreement on the ceasefire was also confirmed by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The country’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi published the corresponding statement on his page on X.
According to the Iranian side’s statement, the 10-point plan proposed by Tehran became the basis for the negotiations. It includes, in particular, commitments of non-aggression, the lifting of sanctions, the withdrawal of American troops from the region, and the maintenance of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Tehran also declared its readiness to ensure safe navigation in the Strait of Hormuz for two weeks under its conditions, while emphasizing its readiness to respond to any violations.
The US and Israel began striking Iran on February 28. On the very first day of hostilities, according to sources, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of high-ranking military leaders of the country were killed.
In response, Tehran began attacks on Israel and countries it considers US allies — the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and other countries in the region.
The Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population of Tajikistan responded to a video on social media, claiming that after taking the anti-parasitic drug “Albendazole,” the health condition of several schoolchildren worsened and they were hospitalized.
The video circulated on social media a few days ago. In it, a woman shows a weakened schoolchild and claims that after taking “Albendazole,” intended for the treatment of helminthiasis, the health of a student in the Farhor district deteriorated.
In a statement by the ministry, published on April 8, it is stated that the hospitalization of children was not related to the intake of the drug. The investigation revealed that the video was shot in the Mir Said Ali Hamadoni district, and the child in the footage is a 10-year-old minor.
“Medical examination showed that the deterioration of the boy’s condition was not related to the intake of ‘Albendazole.’ The child was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes, the main cause of which is heredity,” the ministry noted.
From April 6 to 11, as part of the prevention of helminthiasis among children aged 7–14 in cities and districts of the country, “mass deworming with the drug ‘Albendazole,’ 400 mg” continues. No adverse reactions among students have been recorded, the Ministry of Health added.
The Ministry of Health urged citizens “not to trust rumors and unfounded panic regarding medical services.”
Earlier, the agency had already refuted rumors about the harm of other drugs, including “Pantogam,” as well as information about an “unknown group of doctors going door-to-door,” emphasizing that such information is not true.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a “Easter truce” that will be in effect from 16:00 on April 11 until the end of the day on April 12, the Kremlin reported.
Under his directive, Russian military forces are to “cease hostilities in all directions.”
“Instructions have been given to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrey Belousov, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – Commander of the Joint Group of Forces (troops) General of the Army Valery Gerasimov to cease hostilities in all directions during this period. The troops should be ready to counter any possible provocations from the opponent, as well as any of their aggressive actions,” the statement said.
“We assume that the Ukrainian side will follow the example of the Russian Federation,” the Kremlin added.
Earlier, Volodymyr Zelensky announced Ukraine’s readiness to cease fire during the celebration of Orthodox Easter, which is observed this year on April 12.
The President of Ukraine stated in response to Putin’s decision that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will cease fire on Easter, writes Meduza.
“Ukraine has repeatedly stated that we are ready for reciprocal measures. This year, we proposed a ceasefire for the duration of the Easter holidays and will act accordingly. People need an Easter without threats,” Zelensky said.
According to him, Ukraine has repeatedly expressed its readiness for reciprocal steps and expects “real progress towards peace,” emphasizing that Russia has the opportunity not to resume strikes after the holidays.
In 2025, Putin had already declared a unilateral Easter truce for a duration of one and a half days. At that time, the sides accused each other of numerous violations, although the intensity of hostilities noticeably decreased during this period.
On March 18, 2026, the Investment and Credit Bank of Tajikistan (ICB) and the Football Federation of Tajikistan signed a new strategic partnership agreement at the Dushanbe Serena Hotel. The initiative is aimed at advancing national football and strengthening cooperation between the two institutions.
Press release issued by ICB says the partnership focuses on the development of modern sports infrastructure, support for youth, and the creation of favorable conditions for training and competitions. As part of the agreement, the Bank has undertaken the reconstruction of Field No. 3 of the Central Republican Stadium (46 I. Somoni Street, Sino District, Dushanbe), which will be renamed “ICB Arena.”
The new facility is expected to serve as a platform for nurturing young talent and promoting a strong sporting culture.
The signing ceremony was attended by representatives of the Bank and the Federation, national team players, as well as journalists and bloggers.
Vice President of the Football Federation of Tajikistan, Iskandar Jalilov, noted that the partnership marks a new stage in cooperation. “Support from the private sector plays a crucial role in the development of football. Today’s agreement creates new opportunities to improve infrastructure and provide modern training conditions for young players,” he said.
Chief Executive Officer of ICB, Mirzosafar Safarov, emphasized the social significance of the project. “As reflected in the Bank’s name, the key word is ‘investment.’ Guided by this principle and our mission, we have chosen to invest in the most valuable asset—human health—through the ‘ICB Arena.’ This project will enable talented young people to train in modern conditions and achieve high results,” he stated.
Safarov also announced plans to establish the Bank’s own football team, as well as youth teams under the “ICB” brand, alongside ongoing infrastructure development. “We hope these initiatives will further strengthen Tajikistan’s presence on the global football map,” he added.
The official opening of “ICB Arena” is expected to coincide with the 35th anniversary of Tajikistan’s State Independence.
The event concluded with the formal signing of the agreement. As a symbol of partnership, the Federation presented the Bank with a commemorative football featuring the flags of Tajikistan and the Philippines, marking an important qualifying match for the AFC Asian Cup 2027.
The initiative is expected to contribute to the development of football, promote a healthy lifestyle, and enhance cooperation between the public and private sectors.
Football in Tajikistan today is not only a sport but also a powerful means of uniting society and fostering national pride.
Donald Trump attempts to solve the problem of the lack of an acceptable exit from the war with Iran. Instead of the promised “hell” and “destruction of civilization,” he preferred to sign a two-week truce proposed by mediators from Pakistan. The terms of the ceasefire were unclear for some time (probably even to the signatories themselves). When each side announced its interpretation of these terms, the truce immediately ended.
Iran once again closed the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic, just hours after lifting its blockade. Negotiations scheduled for April 11 are at risk of falling apart, as Washington and Tehran’s positions do not align on any point, and both sides consider themselves victors. As a result, Trump will once again have to consider escalation options that could lead his coalition to a successful exit from the war on their own terms.
What happened in the last 24 hours and why didn’t Trump escalate?
The main point: there was neither “hell” in Iran and the countries of the Persian Gulf, nor (so far) a stable truce.
Donald Trump tried to solve the problem of the Strait of Hormuz, which was effectively blocked by Iran (through demonstrative strikes on tankers in the strait itself, as well as in the Persian and Oman Gulfs, which the strait connects). It was also necessary to stop Iran’s strikes on the infrastructure of neighboring states, including oil and gas infrastructure.
Trump had two fundamentally different approaches available to solve these problems:
escalation: a ground operation, forceful escort of tanker convoys, or massive strikes on Iranian energy and transport—or the threat of such strikes;
de-escalation, meaning a return to negotiations.
Obviously, the US administration considered forceful options: several thousand army and marine personnel were deployed to the Arabian Sea and the countries of the Persian Gulf, along with landing craft and dock equipment. Additional naval forces were likely concentrated in the region. However, there is no precise data on the number of ships that arrived in the Arabian Sea, which could be used both to ensure marine landings and to escort tanker convoys.
All these options have the same drawbacks: organizing convoys, landing on Iranian shores and islands carries risks of losses for the army and navy and does not guarantee that the safety of shipping will be fully restored.
At the same time, Trump tried to force Iran into negotiations by threatening massive strikes on civilian infrastructure. Naturally, carrying out the threat itself would not bring the opening of the strait and/or the cessation of Iranian bombings closer. Moreover, there was a good chance of the opposite effect: Tehran promised to respond with strikes on similar targets in the Persian Gulf countries. However, as the Trump administration likely believed, even the threats of “destroying civilization” would force Iran into greater compromises.
A few hours before the deadline set by Trump as the beginning of “hell” for Iran, the parties agreed on a two-week truce and agreed to hold peace talks—not directly, but through a mediator in the form of Pakistan’s leadership. No formal documents were apparently signed, allowing opponents to interpret the agreement as they wished.
Initially, there were problems with the agenda of the future negotiations: both sides insisted on taking their (mutually exclusive) proposals as the basis of the agreement. Then the truce itself was effectively canceled.
Tehran insisted that it would only agree to a ceasefire if Israel stopped attacks on pro-Iranian Hezbollah proxies in Lebanon. The US and Israel said the agreement does not apply to Lebanon.
Additionally, Iran demanded that Washington recognize its “right to enrich uranium” before negotiations, meaning the continuation of its nuclear program in one form or another. For the Trump administration, which started the war on the pretext of needing to completely destroy this program, this demand is absolutely unacceptable.
The Strait of Hormuz was “opened” for a few hours, after which Tehran declared it closed again and withdrew from negotiations. During this time, only four tankers managed to exit the Persian Gulf.
Hostilities resumed: Israel continued its offensive in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah; someone (we’ll discuss one version of who below) launched an airstrike on an Iranian oil refinery; Iran struck targets in the UAE and a Saudi pipeline supplying oil to a Red Sea port—the only available way to export energy resources from Saudi Arabia bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.
By the end of the first day of the truce, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (considered by the US to be the de facto leader of the country) declared that without a truce in Lebanon and US recognition of “uranium enrichment rights,” the negotiations scheduled for April 11 are meaningless. US Vice President J.D. Vance responded that “it’s stupid, but that’s [the desire to continue fighting over the situation in Lebanon]—Iran’s choice.”
How did it happen that Trump can’t seem to end the war?
The mistake was made during the planning of the operation. It’s difficult to determine exactly what Donald Trump was counting on, but we can try to reconstruct his plan from subsequent actions.
The exact goals of the war were reformulated several times, but one point remained unchanged: Washington intended to achieve the complete cancellation of Iran’s military nuclear program. The method chosen to achieve this goal was an air campaign; a ground operation was not planned in any form: the US not only failed to concentrate the necessary troops before initiating strikes but also evacuated naval forces and most personnel from bases in the Persian Gulf zone to avoid losses.
It was clear in advance that it was impossible to destroy the remnants of the nuclear program with air and missile strikes alone: all its parts that could be destroyed were already destroyed during the previous campaign in June 2025. The program’s resumption and the creation of new capacities (including in shelters buried a hundred meters or more deep) are inevitable as long as the political leadership of Iran wills it.
Accordingly, the problem of the nuclear program could only be solved by changing the political leadership or its capitulation on this critical issue (excluding the option of diplomatic control over the program, which was promoted by the Democratic Party and categorically rejected by Trump). Most likely, the US and Israel hoped for a regime change to a more negotiable one, starting the war with a decapitation strike.
In case of failure of this ambitious plan (i.e., the preservation of a hostile regime in Tehran persisting in its desire to continue nuclear development), the US and Israeli authorities likely intended to halt bombings at a convenient moment for themselves—just as they did in June 2025 during the previous attempt to destroy the Islamic Republic’s nuclear assets. This approach aligns well with Israel’s strategic doctrine of “mowing the lawn” (or “trimming the grass”).
What is this doctrine?
However, Iran executed a counterplan depriving the US of the ability to simply leave the battlefield after inflicting significant losses on the enemy—and with the threat of repeating the operation in some time. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz put the world on the brink of an energy and food crisis (due to a fertilizer shortage).
No matter how much Washington would like to shift the solution of this problem to energy and fertilizer consumers in Asia or NATO allies, only it (if possible at all) can force Tehran to lift the blockade. Strikes on targets in the Persian Gulf countries also compel the US to continue fighting to protect allies.
Simple escalation (in this case, increasing the intensity of strikes) is difficult to change the situation. A ground or naval operation is risky and does not guarantee the restoration of safe navigation and the reduction of Iranian missile and drone attack intensity to an acceptable level.
Didn’t Trump know that Iran has an effective counterplan?
The US President claims that his administration was surprised and shocked by the strikes on the infrastructure of allies in the Gulf. As for the closure of the strait, he allegedly “warned about it long ago,” but believed that destroying the Iranian navy would solve the problem.
However, it is known that the Trump administration was informed about the Iranian plan. In 2025, the US intelligence community (which includes representatives of all agencies with intelligence units—from the CIA to the Treasury) in an open report on threats to the country, indicated that in the event of an escalation, Iran would likely strike Gulf countries and close the strait (in the latter case, intelligence clarified that minelayers, submarines, and small boats would be used for this purpose). The Trump administration likely assumed that powerful strikes on Iranian missile arsenals and bases, mobile launchers, and ships would eliminate these risks.
This clearly shows poor study of the Russian-Ukrainian war experience: despite having no combat ships, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet using sea drones and long-range UAVs in the enclosed Black Sea waters, occasionally disrupting Russian shipping and energy resource loading. Iran replicated this strategy, reinforcing it with verbal attacks: along with a couple of dozen real drone strikes on tankers, there are messages (via radio) to ship crews about inevitable attacks if unauthorized passage through the strait occurs or that the fairway is mined. It is unknown whether such mining has actually been conducted; most specialized minelayers have been sunk by US airstrikes.
In any case, the “closure” of the strait proved quite reliable: few dare to pass without Iran’s permission. Permission is granted to tankers carrying Iranian and Iraqi oil (in the last few days), as well as ships from other “friendly” countries that have paid a “fee” of one dollar per barrel of oil.
So, is a truce impossible? And what else can Trump do to ensure victory?
In its current form, the conflict has all the signs of a war of attrition. Both sides believe they are at least not losing. And they present to the public clearly inflated estimates of their successes and combat capability.
For instance, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Kane stated that the US and Israel destroyed almost all missile installations, missile production factories, and Shahed-type drone production capacities—not to mention naval ships, mine stockpiles, etc.
Iran, as reported by Pakistani mediators, claimed to be winning the war, as it still possesses 15,000 ballistic missiles reserves and tens of thousands of drones—almost an order of magnitude more than the most optimistic pre-war estimates of its potential by independent experts.
In recent weeks, Iran has been launching 30–40 missiles and 40–60 long-range UAVs a day at targets throughout the Middle East. The consistency in the scale of these salvos clearly indicates that Tehran is not experiencing critical problems caused by opponents’ strikes on missile bases but is trying to economize and ration ammunition consumption. If pre-war estimates are to be believed, Iran’s missile and drone stockpile should have lasted 1–2 months of fighting at the current intensity. However, Tehran is maintaining the “schedule” of strikes, and there are no signs of its exhaustion.
The US and Israel face similar problems: most of the stocks of the most effective munitions and interceptor missiles capable of hitting Iranian ballistic missiles will be depleted in a couple of months (assuming the current rate of exchange of strikes is maintained). Of course, even then, the US can continue hostilities, relying on less effective (and more risky in terms of combat aircraft losses) solutions. Already, a significant portion of US aviation uses conventional bombs with JDAM satellite navigation planning and correction systems. Their use in most cases implies the presence of aircraft over Iranian territory with all the accompanying risks.
The situation where the parties to the conflict consider themselves victors and seek guarantees of consolidating their victory is described in scientific literature dedicated to the end of wars from a game theory perspective. Initially, the parties must obtain the missing information about the balance of forces with the opponent as a result of hostilities. Obviously, this moment of truth in the US-Iran conflict has not yet arrived.
The outcome of the confrontation depends on the share of resources each side is willing to commit. While the regime in Tehran is involved in an existential war, Washington continues to conduct a limited air operation. If this mode is maintained, the US will have to make significant concessions just to “exit” the war. Obviously, Tehran intends to extract the maximum from its current status as the “master of the Strait of Hormuz.”
With increased involvement in the war (and escalation), the chances of a favorable outcome for the US will increase—as will the risks of losses. Among the options for using naval, marine, and ground forces, an assault on the Iranian islands in the Strait of Hormuz using large naval forces (dozens of destroyers with advanced air defense systems) is the most suitable for solving current problems.
Armies from the Persian Gulf countries may likely participate in such an attack (these countries do not intend to pay the “fee” for tanker passage through the strait). As reported by Iranian media, UAE aviation attacked an Iranian oil refinery on Lavan Island immediately after the truce was announced.
The two-week truce may be just a facade for both sides. Behind it lies the desire to intensify hostilities. Judging by the deployment of forces to the Middle East, the US may still be planning a risky combined naval and marine operation to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
In Bokhtar, a 33-year-old man was detained on suspicion of murdering his cousin. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan reports that his name is Faridun Akhmedov, and he resides on Madaniyat Street in Bokhtar.
According to the agency, there had been quarrels and conflicts between him and his aunt’s son, 40-year-old Salmonkhon Shirinov, a resident of Kahramoni village in Kushoniyon district, for some time.
“Once again, they argued on March 27 of this year in Bokhtar, at their grandfather’s house. According to the investigation, Shirinov first attacked with a knife, but the detainee knocked him down, snatched the knife from his hands, and inflicted seven wounds on vital organs with particular cruelty. The victim, having received severe injuries, died at the scene,” reports the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In the interrogation recording, Faridun Akhmedov confessed to committing the crime. A criminal case has been initiated against him under Article 104 (“Murder”) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the investigation is ongoing. This article provides for a punishment ranging from 8 years of imprisonment to life imprisonment.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs also reports that Faridun Akhmedov had previously been convicted on charges of robbery (Article 248 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan) and served his sentence.
Участники 9-го регионального совещания руководителей погранведомств государств СНГ. Фото с сайта skpw.ru
The unstable military-political and economic situation in Afghanistan is expected to have a destructive impact on the state of border security in the Central Asian direction in the medium term. This conclusion was reached by participants of the 9th regional meeting of the heads of border agencies of the CIS member states in the city of Guliston, Sughd Region, Tajikistan.
The meeting, held on April 8 with the participation of delegations from the border agencies of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Russia, as well as representatives from the CSTO and CIS, emphasized the importance of enhancing cooperation in the field of border security to effectively counter the threats arising from the unstable situation in Afghanistan, reported the CIS Executive Committee.
The participants of the meeting discussed the measures being taken by the border agencies of the CIS member states to counter threats to border security on the external borders of Central Asian countries.
According to the general opinion, the current situation in Afghanistan is expected to have a destructive impact on border security in the medium term, making it important to strengthen cooperation in this area.
Photo from skpw.ru
Focus on Joint Programs and Experience Sharing
In this regard, the significance of the Cooperation Program of the CIS member states in strengthening border security on external borders for the years 2026–2030 was emphasized. This program is a key mechanism for the practical implementation of the coordinated border policy of the CIS countries.
The participants also emphasized the activation of the participation of border agencies in the Interstate Program of Joint Crime-Fighting Measures for 2024–2028, as well as in the CIS Cooperation Program in the field of countering terrorism and extremism for 2026–2028.
The meeting participants noted the positive experience of including in the agenda of working meetings of border agency specialists, as well as international scientific forums dedicated to exchanging experiences on preventive counteraction to modern border security threats.
As a result of the meeting, a set of practical measures was developed to maintain stability on the external borders of the Commonwealth.
After the meeting, the guest delegations visited an exhibition of folk crafts, national cuisine, and cultural traditions of the Tajik people in the city of Guliston.
According to the updated data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tajikistan ranked last in Central Asia in terms of GDP per capita, which amounted to $1430 in 2025. This places the country among the lowest in the Eurasian region in terms of economic level, despite positive growth trends.
According to IMF forecasts, in 2026, Tajikistan’s GDP per capita will rise to $1800, indicating a steady improvement in the country’s economic situation, yet the figures will still be significantly lower compared to other Central Asian countries.
The Telegram channel Geostatistics reports that over the past 30 years, nominal GDP per capita in Tajikistan has increased 6.7 times. In 1995, this figure was only $214.
Infographic from the Telegram channel “Geostatistics”
For comparison, other countries of the former USSR show significantly higher results. In Kazakhstan, where the economy continues to develop, GDP per capita in 2025 is $14,770, which is more than 10 times that of Tajikistan. In Turkmenistan, GDP per capita is $13,340, while in Uzbekistan this figure reaches $3510.
The IMF calculates GDP per capita at current prices, which allows for an assessment of the overall level of welfare and purchasing power.
Качество воздуха в Душанбе портит бурное строительство. Фото: asia+
Tajikistan refutes the data from the international platform IQAir, according to which the republic is among the countries with the most polluted air in the world.
Director of the Agency for Hydrometeorology, Abdullo Kurbonzoda, stated in a meeting with journalists that the assessments presented in the “World Air Quality Report for 2025” do not reflect the real situation in the country.
According to the IQAir report, in 2025 Tajikistan ranked third in the world in terms of air pollution with a PM2.5 level of 57.3 µg/m³. This is 11.4 times higher than the level recommended by the World Health Organization.
In 2024, according to IQAir, Tajikistan was ranked 6th in terms of air quality, while in 2023, data specifically for Dushanbe placed the capital in 4th place.
The issue of air quality in Tajikistan, particularly in its capital, has remained relevant for several years. International monitoring services, the Committee for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense, and the city’s own residents regularly report on pollution. Media publications over recent years point to this as well.
Residents of the capital complain about black dust on windows and cars, as well as reduced visibility — in previous years, the mountains surrounding Dushanbe could be seen from any point in the capital, but now they are increasingly obscured by smog. This situation is observed even outside the periods of dust storms.
Doctors and allergists previously noted that during air pollution, the number of allergic and respiratory diseases, including bronchial asthma and allergic tracheobronchitis, increases.
The main sources of pollution in Tajikistan: dust and degraded soil, heating of the private sector with solid fuels, energy, and transport.
Tajikistan’s Hydromet: IQAir data is questionable
The authorities of Tajikistan question the conclusions of the IQAir report, pointing to the discrepancy between the presented data and the actually recorded air quality indicators in the country. Director of the Agency for Hydrometeorology, Abdullo Kurbonzoda, emphasized on April 3 at a meeting with journalists that the assessments used in the report do not reflect an accurate picture.
Abdullo Kurbonzoda speaks to journalists, April 3, 2026. Following the publication of the study, the Agency invited the media to a meeting for the first time.
“When it is written about our republic that the air is completely polluted, it is wrong,” he stated.
In the official explanation of the Agency, it is also noted that such assessments “should be considered in a balanced manner, with scientific validity and a professional approach.” The agency emphasizes that the ranking is based on the annual average concentration of fine particulate matter PM2.5 and “does not fully reflect all the factors affecting atmospheric air quality in the country.”
Kurbonzoda also drew attention to significant fluctuations in air quality indicators over time. According to him, after the precipitation was restored, the situation improved significantly.
“Since December 4, 2025, there have been no dust storms in Tajikistan… In the last four months, our air has been very clean,” he stated.
Kurbonzoda says that given the natural features, Tajikistan is not one of the countries with developed industry and constant sources of severe pollution.
“Tajikistan is 93% mountains; we do not have factories and plants that heavily pollute the air. Where, then, do such data come from?” he questions.
However, observations by residents and independent ecologists do not entirely confirm this assessment. Even in the absence of dust storms, Dushanbe experiences persistent pollution — in the form of smog, the smell of burning, and the accumulation of fine dust.
Such conditions may indicate a high content of suspended particles in the air, even if such phenomena are not officially classified as a dust storm.
View of Dushanbe from its highest point — Victory Park, January 16, 2026. Visibility is limited despite claims of clean air after December 4. Photo: asia+
How many sensors and where are they located?
In the official commentary, Hydromet also indicates that the country’s position in the international ranking depends “not only on the real environmental condition but also on the completeness, density, and coverage of the air quality monitoring network.” According to the agency, drawing generalized conclusions for the whole country without considering these factors is incorrect.
Separate criticism concerns the methods of measurement and data assessment. According to Kurbonzoda, using a limited number of sensors does not allow for conclusions about the air condition throughout the city or country.
“Placing a sensor next to a construction site and claiming that all of Dushanbe’s air is polluted is wrong… Measurement in one place does not mean that the air in general is polluted,” he emphasized.
Abdullo Kurbonzoda explained that IQAir employees assessed air pollution levels in Tajikistan based on data from two devices installed in Dushanbe — at the “Textilmash” plant and the Dushanbe CHP.
“There are certain rules for measurements: the device measuring air quality should be located at a certain distance from roads and industrial facilities. Setting two devices right in the smoke and evaluating Tajikistan’s air quality based on this is a mistake,” he explained once again.
Chimneys of the Dushanbe CHP-1. Archive photo asia+
Meanwhile, according to the international platform IQAir, they collect information from 4–6 stations in Dushanbe, including diplomatic missions and private sensors.
Hydromet: IQAir data does not consider features
According to Hydromet representatives, international platforms may also insufficiently take into account the geographical and climatic features of the country — mountainous terrain, seasonality, dust transfer.
In the official explanation of the Agency, this is formulated as follows:
“The specified rating is compiled based on the average annual concentration of fine particles measuring PM2.5 and does not fully reflect all the factors influencing atmospheric air quality in the country.”
Meanwhile, IQAir claims that such factors are considered through weather data, satellite observations, and processing algorithms.
Thus, the disagreements are not so much about the facts as about their interpretation and the methodology used for assessment, according to Hydromet.
IQAir researchers claim that their data undergo processing: they are compared with other stations, weather conditions, and historical values, reducing the impact of local emissions.
And how does Tajikistan itself check the air?
In Tajikistan, air quality is monitored through a monitoring system managed by the Agency for Hydrometeorology.
How exactly the atmosphere is checked was explained at a meeting with journalists by the head of the Regional Environmental Monitoring Center, Sangin Samiev.
Head of the Regional Environmental Monitoring Center, Sangin Samiev, discusses air quality monitoring in the region. Photo: asia+
Currently, the observation network covers four regions of the country: Dushanbe, Bokhtar, Khujand, and Tursunzade.
In these cities, stationary posts operate where specialists regularly measure the concentration of major pollutants — suspended particles (PM2.5 and PM10), nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, formaldehyde, and other compounds.
In addition to stationary points, the country uses modern automatic monitoring stations that conduct round-the-clock observations.
Since November 2016, an automatic air quality monitoring station has been operational at the Agency, created in collaboration with the Finnish Meteorological Institute (a research agency in Finland — Ed. note). This station provides round-the-clock monitoring of the atmosphere in Dushanbe.
All together, they record not only the chemical composition of the air but also meteorological parameters: temperature, humidity, pressure, wind direction, and speed. This allows for a more accurate assessment of the atmosphere and predicting its changes.
Weather and air quality monitoring station in an urban environment. Photo: asia+
Route monitoring also plays a significant role. For this, mobile laboratories equipped with special equipment are used. They allow for measurements in various areas, including places with potentially high levels of pollution.
During such studies, the concentration of nitrogen oxides, ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, hydrocarbons, methane, as well as fine particles is measured.
Additionally, specialists collect air samples for laboratory analysis, use portable devices, and even unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to assess air quality.
Mobile environmental laboratory used for air condition analysis. Photo: asia+
In parallel, precipitation — rain and snow — is analyzed, which also helps to determine the pollution level. The collected data is systematized and processed in information departments.
Based on observations, environmental bulletins are regularly prepared, which are sent to relevant agencies and communicated to the public, says Sangin Samiev.
According to him, more than three thousand air quality measurements are conducted in Dushanbe alone per quarter, and more than five thousand observations are made across the country.
At the same time, monitoring data is not published in real-time on any single open platform. There is a Hydromet website, where, according to specialists, air pollution levels in the cities of the republic are posted every morning. However, the information is presented in a way that an ordinary person cannot understand whether the air is dirty in their city today.
Despite the disagreements, the combination of data from international platforms, observations, and expert assessments shows that the level of air pollution in Dushanbe regularly exceeds WHO recommendations.
For example, not only IQAir rankings indicate that the air in Dushanbe remains dirty. According to a World Bank study, the average annual concentration of PM2.5 in Dushanbe in 2020–2022 was 54.6 µg/m³, and in winter it could reach 152–434 µg/m³.
According to the WB, to significantly improve air quality in Dushanbe, about $111 million in investments is needed. These funds are necessary for heating modernization, reducing solid fuel use, developing public transport, and expanding the air quality monitoring system.
The Agency for Hydrometeorology emphasizes that rankings cannot be ignored, but it is also incorrect to perceive them as a completely exhaustive assessment of air quality across the Republic of Tajikistan.
Specialist Jamilya Baidullaeva demonstrates the air quality monitoring system. Photo: asia+
The differences primarily relate to assessment methods rather than the existence of the problem itself, note Hydromet specialists.
“This ranking (IQAir) indicates a serious problem with PM2.5 particles, but for accurate conclusions, extended monitoring, comparison of international data with national observations, and analysis of pollution sources are necessary. Such an approach can be objective, professional, and in line with the country’s interests,” Tajik specialists emphasize once again.
And environmentalist Timur Idrisov believes that “it is necessary not only to expand the observation network but also to radically revise approaches to urban planning, energy efficiency, and emissions control. Without this, even the most modern air quality data will not help solve the problem.”
